

IFP REGIONAL COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT,
ECONOMY AND NATURAL RESOURCES CLUSTER

REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

A contribution to peacebuilding?

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REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

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ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AEC	African Economic Community
AFREC	African Energy Commission
AU	African Union
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEPGL	Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPIX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NELSAP	Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme
EAC	East African Community
EAPP	East African Power Pool
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EF	Energy Facility
EU	European Union
EUEI	European Union Energy Initiative
EMCCA	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FTA	Free Trade Area
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IRCC	Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PDF	Partnership Dialogue Facility
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIA	Regional Integration Arrangement
RIIs	Regional Initiatives and Institutions
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SINELAC	Société Internationale d'Electricité des Pays de Grands Lacs
TPC	Tripartite Plus Joint Commission
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This case study seeks to analyse the peacebuilding potential of regional cooperation initiatives in the Great Lakes Region. The Great Lakes Region epitomises the often interconnected, regional nature of conflict. The populations of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have suffered violence for years and improving human security in this context requires interconnected long-term, systematic peacebuilding approaches to address regional dimensions. Regional economic issues, such as cross-border trade and joint energy production may well provide useful entry points for regional cooperation as they have the potential to provide mutual incentives and increase interdependence among economies. Furthermore, they can foster economic development and strengthen the livelihoods of local populations. However, regional economic approaches will not automatically contribute to peacebuilding unless this goal is explicitly integrated into the design of regional initiatives and in processes for building and sustaining regional institutions.

This study highlights two regional cooperation initiatives focussing on cross-border trade and energy which integrate peacebuilding objectives: the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR) and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). Despite continuous efforts supported by donors (the European Commission among them), IC/GLR and CEPGL have thus far experienced limited peacebuilding success. They lack effective capacity, political commitment and even the trust of participating countries, partly as a result of decades of conflict.

These issues will need to be addressed. If ignored, current problems will not only impede the potential peacebuilding impact of regional cooperation, but also hinder opportunities for trade and energy cooperation that could improve human security.

The findings of this case study have contributed to the synthesis report of the Initiative for Peacebuilding's Regional Cooperation on Environment, Natural Resources and the Economy Cluster, which draws on the results from four regional case studies.¹

Keywords: Regional cooperation institutions, Great Lakes Region, energy, trade.

¹ This report covers events up until December 2008. As such it does not cover political developments that have happened with regard to regional relations, and their related impact on regional institutions, since then. The three other case studies mentioned here are: Wittich, A. and Maas, A. (2009). *Regional cooperation in the South Caucasus: Lessons for peacebuilding, from economy and environment*; Kramer, A. (2008). *Regional water cooperation and peacebuilding in the Middle East*; and Godnick, W., Klein, D., González-Posso, C., Mendoza, I. and Meneses, S. (2008). *Conflict economy international cooperation and non renewable natural resources*.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the most intense periods of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, when armies and militias waged war, both internally and across borders, regional economic cooperation continued – legally and illegally – at the local transboundary level, as well as in the international arena. During that time, cross-border trade and shared energy initiatives persisted and provided much needed support for livelihoods and contributed to human security.

One example of such cooperation is the production of hydropower in the region through the *Société Internationale d'Electricité des Pays de Grands Lacs* (SINELAC). SINELAC, a joint venture among Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan electricity agencies, has survived since its foundation in the 1970s. The tripartite management of the Ruzizi II hydropower station, located on the border region between the countries, provided electricity to communities in the region during periods marred by hostile relations and violent wars between governments. This example highlights the importance of regional cooperation in an area affected by years of turmoil and violent conflict. However, it also raises questions as to whether existing frameworks for regional cooperation can support broader peacebuilding efforts and facilitate more peaceful relations between states. The potential for regional cooperation efforts in the region to contribute to peacebuilding depends critically on how such initiatives and their activities are designed and implemented, as the example of SINELAC reflects. This report therefore critically examines the often assumed relationship between regional cooperation initiatives and peacebuilding. The approach used in this case study builds on a political economy perspective, highlighting the interplay between political, economic and technical factors as well as the dynamics among stakeholders involved. Such dynamics can influence the degree to which an intervention can address conflict, vulnerability and ultimately support peacebuilding processes of critical importance to the region.²

In order to better understand how external actors support regional cooperation to build peace in the Great Lakes Region, this report focuses on energy and trade. To this end, two regional institutions have been selected to illustrate the ways in which these sectors are being promoted to build peace. The first is the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR), which was established in 2004 by the UN and the AU. With a mandate to create lasting conditions for security, stability, sustainable development and reconstruction, the IC/GLR has several (although at the time of writing not yet fully implemented) key “pillars” which frame programmes and activities. Under the economic development pillar, the IC/GLR supports the revival of the CEPGL, an institution that was initially established in 1976 with the aim of promoting regional economic cooperation. CEPGL is the second institution analysed in this report. While the two institutions take different starting points – peacebuilding versus economic cooperation – they both advocate regional cooperation through the promotion of shared economic interests, such as joint energy projects and greater cross-border trade. They also both aim to pursue activities in response to conflict and expect to contribute to peacebuilding.

The greatest challenges to economic cooperation remain the current state of relations between Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda, particularly the latter two, and the continuing conflict in Eastern DRC. Moreover, state fragility in the DRC and Burundi continues to affect these states' abilities to act effectively in regional fora. These challenges cannot be seen as negative externalities that regional cooperation efforts and related institutions can sideline, but should inform all areas of planning and institution building for regional cooperation. While joint

² The interaction of economic and political processes is, at its foundation, about power relationships: how they are created and what sustains them. In conflict-affected situations, such a form of analysis brings greater understanding not just to “who” the vulnerable are, but also the dynamic patterns that exist as to why certain groups benefit more than others, how people profit and how peacebuilding interventions can be strengthened. For example, see ODI HPG Briefing Paper on political economy approaches, available at www.odi.org.uk/HPG/papers/hpgbrief8.pdf.

economic activities should further benefit local populations through the provision of economic opportunities and vital services, to ultimately achieve peacebuilding aims they must also seek to engage member states in political as well as technical dialogue, and foster productive linkages between the two.

METHODOLOGY

The research for this report has been conducted both in the Great Lakes Region and in Europe throughout 2008. Desk studies were complemented by semi-structured interviews and discussions in Rwanda, the DRC and Burundi with government officials, donor agency staff members, employees from regional institutions and members of civil society, including NGOs and the private sector. Additional perspectives were solicited from Brussels and London and the draft of this report was peer-reviewed.

Before taking a closer look at regional institutions and IC/GLR and CEPGL in particular, the two thematic areas of interest to regional cooperation in this report – energy cooperation and cross-border trade – are introduced and embedded in the broader regional conflict dynamics.

REGIONAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Violent conflicts are intrinsically tied to regional drivers, and include arms flows and illicit finances such as war economies. The devastation of war is not limited to single communities or countries; population displacement, disrupted trade patterns and ruined infrastructure and markets are also regional in their scope and impact.

The links between economies and conflict on a regional scale have come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, as violent conflicts have a devastating impact on a region's economy and populations' livelihoods. Yet the regional dimensions of conflict are often neglected in economic recovery and development efforts. Despite the political, economic, military and social interconnections that exist between communities and across borders during and following conflict, recovery and peacebuilding efforts generally remain within national frameworks.³ When such recovery policies are applied to a single state, unintended consequences for neighbouring states can result, such as the smuggling of illegal goods or people, including mercenary fighters. Hence, the region remains affected by conflict and instability. Most importantly though, policies and activities confined to individual states remain ineffective to combat such transboundary problems and even run the risk of undermining their own aims.

Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda have all experienced the impact of conflict and instability in neighbouring states at the national level. Armies, militias, refugees and civilians can all cross porous borders in the region. These countries have also experienced aggression emerging from within neighbouring countries; some armed groups, such as the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) which operates in the Kivu provinces of the country, developed from foreign fighters entering the DRC following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments launched military interventions in the DRC during the wars of 1996 and 1998 and neighbouring governments have been accused of providing financial and logistical support to rebel groups operating on Congolese soil.⁴ The conflict in the DRC alone has created an estimated 300,000 refugees in neighbouring countries, with the number continuing to rise.⁵

Establishing a basis of mutual trust and interdependence following such wars of regional scope creates enormous challenges, as is evident in the Great Lakes Region. Tensions and suspicions exist between governments and there is limited confidence in each other's ability and/or willingness to address the causes and drivers of conflict. These apprehensions also exist between and within communities, especially where access to citizenship rights and resources, such as land, are contested, as evidenced by the Rwandophone community in Eastern DRC.⁶ The ongoing conflicts and failed peace agreements exacerbate the lack of trust and confidence exhibited at all

3 House of Commons International Development Committee (2006). 'Conflict and development: Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction'. Collinson, S. (Ed.) (2003). *Power, livelihoods and conflict: Case studies in political economy analysis for humanitarian action*. ODI Humanitarian Policy Group Report 13.

4 United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2008, Nest 2006. Just before this report was finalised, the Rwandan army entered the DRC again, this time apparently in support of the Congolese government army. Available at www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=19908, 20 January 2009.

5 UNHCR (2007). *UNHCR Global Report, DRC*.

6 Despite recent changes to the Congolese constitution that, de jure, grant broad-based rights of citizenship, many within Rwandophone communities continue to face uncertain legal standing in the country and are regarded as foreigners by so-called *autochtones* (indigenous Congolese).

levels.⁷ This makes shared efforts to bring about effective peacebuilding – let alone economic recovery on national or regional levels – a distant goal.

The complexity and dynamism of the local, national and regional dimensions of conflict make it difficult for any kind of intervention to comprehensively address all issues. Donor agencies aiming to support economic recovery processes often recognise the regional dimensions to conflict, but rarely translate this knowledge into regional approaches to – and implementation of – peacebuilding and economic recovery. When a regional approach to economic activities is promoted, peacebuilding impacts are simply assumed and not integrated in programme objectives, designs and processes. Many donor agencies continue to operate within the confines of a singularly positive relationship between economic growth and stability in conflict-affected countries, in which they assume the nexus of economic growth, leading to poverty reduction which will contribute to peace.⁸ Their strategies often only address national authorities, excluding other significant stakeholders at sub-national and local levels, as well as non-governmental parties. Additionally, donor institutional structures, such as country strategies and desks instead of regional strategies, can hinder an integrated regional approach. Currently, EC regional initiatives are coordinated through Brussels rather than European Delegations being in direct exchange with each other.

Economic recovery efforts in conflict-affected countries are often criticised for focusing entirely on growth. In some cases they promote regional economic cooperation with the stated objective of building peace. This approach is premised on the idea that closer cooperation between countries with respect to issues of mutual interest, namely the economy, will build trust between them, create mutual incentives in each other's stability and prosperity and facilitate more constructive relationships between adversaries. The European Union model is often invoked in such situations; however, in the fragile and unique context of the Great Lakes Region, such references appear misplaced. Context-specific circumstances are crucial when exploring ways to strengthen the peacebuilding aspects of economic recovery and in ensuring that interventions have the potential to address the regional dimensions of economic interdependence, conflict and peace.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN A CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

After decades of conflict and mismanagement, the economy of the Great Lakes Region is highly militarised and largely informal. The informal spheres reveal the paradoxical situation that lies at the heart of the region's insecurity. The DRC's abundance in valuable natural resources and precious minerals has offered little benefit and created much insecurity for its population, but these resources could only be exploited to finance wars because of the vibrant and diverse local-level, cross-border trade in the region. These informal trade and economic interdependencies⁹ clearly fuelled violence in the past but also offer a crucial entry point for peaceful cooperation across political divergences. In particular, regarding the aim of fostering peace through economic development, existing trade connections – whether formal or informal – offer important potential.

Whilst tensions and violence continue among populations living in close proximity to international borders, economic interactions between and among those populations represent critical sources of livelihoods. Beyond the illicit trade in natural resources, there is an entire spectrum of economic undertakings occurring between traders and across borders. The most important element of cross-border trade from the local community's point of view is trade in agricultural goods, such as the sale of tomatoes by Rwandan traders in the DRC. As the region suffers severely from energy shortages, petroleum is also very important for trade relationships. More formalised forms of cooperation exist as well, such as the above-mentioned hydropower dams that run along the Ruzizi River. Whilst the Rwandan government's official diplomatic ties to the DRC were broken after 1998, electricity still continues to flow between the two countries through a joint-management scheme (see sections on "Energy" and "The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries"). These formal and informal economic cooperation schemes have persisted throughout decades of war and cycles of violence, signifying the resilience of such technical networks in the face of conflict.

⁷ For example, the Goma Conference was initiated by President Kabila in January 2008 to save the peace process in Eastern DRC, following the defeat of the Congolese army against the CNDP in December 2007. It resulted in the signing of acts of engagement to be implemented under the responsibility of the Amani process. However, the implementation of the agreements, including the commitment by the DRC to dismantle the FDLR in Eastern DRC and renewed attempts, such as the Nairobi communiqué, have failed so far.

⁸ DFID, 2005; World Bank, 2000; SIDA, 2005.

⁹ Tegera and Johnson, 2007.

This signals a genuine potential for peace. Before building on these cooperation networks and economic activities to promote peace, however, they must be better understood: for instance, how economic networks survive during conflict, how power dynamics can skew economics and promote predatory economic practices, and finally how war economies evolve and are sustained. This analysis needs to inform donor-supported regional cooperation and support networks that can foster trade and energy cooperation with peacebuilding impacts.

REGIONAL APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING

Regional approaches to peacebuilding can be integrative or cooperative. Integrative and cooperative approaches mainly pursue different objectives, establish different institutional structures and vary in their effectiveness. Existing integration agreements in the Great Lakes Region, for example, mainly focus on trade and production. Cooperation agreements involve selected policy harmonisation or joint production of public goods, such as security, while integration arrangements are characterised by much deeper mutual interaction or synergies. Regional cooperation initiatives tend to be more selective in their coverage and generally require less long-term commitment than integration. Research indicates that countries of Sub-Saharan Africa can benefit more from regional cooperation than from formal trade integration.¹⁰

However, regional cooperation may also hold some critical stumbling blocks hindering successful institutionalised regional cooperation. The biggest obstacles revealed in this analysis (see sections on “IC/GLR” and “CEPGL”) are:

- Lack of political commitment to - and ownership of - regional cooperation by member states;
- Lack of capacity of member states to engage in such initiatives;
- Insufficient attention to existing regional political and economic asymmetries;
- Continued mistrust and mutual suspicion among members; and
- Top-down approaches that exclude many stakeholders.

Not only is there a risk that institutions promoting regional cooperation remain ineffective, but there is also a risk that their failure could jeopardise regional prosperity and sustainable peace in the long term. Further, promoting such economic cooperation without first analysing the political economy and ignoring the ways in which the economy itself may drive conflict dynamics can aggravate hostilities. In the Great Lakes Region, this disregard can include issues of underlying systems of control and access to economic resources based on coercion or even violence as well as horizontal and geographical inequalities feeding resentment and tensions. It can further include corruption and patronage closely linked to ruling elites or armed groups that continue to play a key role in perpetuating and benefiting from violent conflict and tensions.

While regional cooperation may be important in developing constructive relations between states, it cannot be assumed that pooling resources to provide public goods for populations and creating platforms for dialogue regarding shared interests will automatically follow. Whether regional cooperation yields peacebuilding benefits depends on the capacities and willingness of those involved – as ownership is a key element of success – as well as the design and processes of the cooperation.

ENERGY

The energy sector lends itself to regional cooperation. Neighbouring countries can share the burden of financing and managing large infrastructure projects by interconnecting and stabilising their electricity grids. Energy cooperation has the potential for peacebuilding through a number of mechanisms. First, it creates interdependence and mutual benefits in a strategic economic area (such as the European Coal and Steel community in its time). Second, interdependence requires and is intended to build trust. Ideally, cooperation with respect to energy can bring political leaders together as well as technical experts, which can open channels for broader dialogue. Third, affordable electricity and a reliable energy supply are prerequisites for long-term economic recovery and development. They both allow for value creation, for example, by facilitating the further processing of raw materials and agricultural produce. In areas where poverty and socio-economic deprivation are causes of conflict, energy production may contribute to peacebuilding if it promotes equitable access and improves human security by enabling socio-economic development.

¹⁰ Mistry, 2000; Mytelka, 1994; Foroutan, 1993; de Melo and Panagariya, 1992; Ravenhill, 1990; Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990.

Energy in the Great Lakes Region

Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda all suffer from severe energy and electricity deficits, resulting in power shortages and high power costs.¹¹ The region is highly dependent on bio fuels for cooking and importing petroleum to run generators.

TABLE 1: ELECTRICITY NET INLAND AVAILABILITY 2006 (IN MILLION KWH)

Burundi (Population ~8.5 million)	123 (estimate)
Rwanda (Population ~10 million)	176 (estimate)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Population ~66 million)	3,030
By way of comparison, industrialised countries with comparable populations:	
Sweden (Population ~9 million)	130,806
United Kingdom (Population ~61 million)	342,779

Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2008). 'Energy Statistics Database'. Available at <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=EDATA&f=cmlID%3aEL>.

The most significant energy source for electricity production in the Great Lakes Region is hydropower. The DRC has huge hydropower potential, while Burundi and Rwanda are significantly more dependent on regional cooperation for energy production due to their lesser domestic hydropower potential. The main hydropower potential for Burundi, the Eastern DRC and Rwanda is located close to national borders and is dependent on shared rivers. Similarly, Lake Kivu's methane gas, which is being explored for energy production by Rwanda, is also a shared resource between the DRC and Rwanda. These circumstances make energy cooperation among Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda important. The largest hydropower dam in the region, Ruzizi II, is a joint project dating back to the three countries' original cooperation through CEPGL and SINELAC (see section on "CEPGL"). While each country is striving to produce more energy independent of their neighbours, there is also a clear acknowledgment by Rwandan and Burundian leaders of the need to tackle the immense energy provision challenge multilaterally in the medium term.

One example of strong regional cooperation in the area of energy is the Indicative Power Master Plan, which the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP) – in partnership with the World Bank – managed to develop for six (upstream) countries. The plan was signed by the respective ministers of electricity affairs in December 2005 and will continue to identify power generation options and transmission interconnection projects for the next 20 years. The initial goal was to integrate the plan into the EAC power master plan for Burundi, Rwanda and Western Tanzania, but in 2004, the project was expanded to include all of Tanzania as well as Kenya, Uganda and – beyond the EAC borders – the eastern part of the DRC.¹² The master plan does not give any indication whether or how peace and stability in the region was taken into account in the decision to include Eastern DRC. In consequence, however, the inclusion of Eastern DRC has the potential to foster closer energy cooperation among the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. Omitting the DRC could have further entrenched the political divide between these countries and disadvantaged the population and economy of Eastern DRC.

CROSS-BORDER TRADE

There are several ways in which regional trade cooperation can provide mutual benefits and strengthen peaceful cooperation in the region, for example through mutual development gains stemming from pooled resources, expanded markets and greater economic diversification. Another is the potential long-term stabilising role that

¹¹ Bikumu, 2005; Midende, 2006.

¹² See Indicative Power Master Plan, available at www.nelsap.nilebasin.org and www.worldbank.org.

could result from reducing illicit trade for example in natural resources.¹³ Such cross-border trade should build closer ties between countries. Regulated commercial interaction, promotion of dialogue, increasingly visible interdependence and support for bilateral stability all contribute to cooperation. Trade is believed to create incentives on both sides for dialogue and cooperation in contexts of mistrust and isolationist thinking that often exist between states and communities during or in the aftermath of violent conflict.¹⁴ But this requires investment in the rule of law as well as accepted and mutually agreed upon customs and border controls.

While various empirical studies seem to ‘confirm the adage that countries that trade with each other (on equitable terms) are less likely to fight each other’,¹⁵ the degree to which regional trade can create sustained and widely shared prosperity greatly depends on the extent to which such trade patterns promote broadly shared opportunities, inclusiveness, and equally shared benefits between trading partners. Yet this cannot be assumed in situations where state elites are militarised, corruption is embedded and when states do not operate in the best economic interests of their citizens.

Initiatives promoting trade cooperation rarely take into account the ability of states and populations to manage benefits and losses incurred as a result of closer cooperation. Likewise, the ability of initiatives to adequately address the challenges faced by informal and petty traders remain limited. The impact of cross-border trade policies on the livelihoods of those in the informal sector and of those engaged in illicit smuggling activities are rarely examined. The informal and formal trade is closely tied to existing war economies in the region, as they are based on the same economic infrastructures. Given the link between predatory economies and trade in the region, it is clear that there are powerful actors with a vested interest in the current status quo of unregulated trade. It is therefore important to have a clear understanding of who will benefit, and who will inevitably lose from regulated cross-border trade based on a thorough actor analysis at the macro and micro-levels. If transparency at border crossings were to be increased, for example, some might perceive the change as a real or potential financial loss, while others may gain from better regulated customs.

Cross-border trade in the Great Lakes region

There have been several official attempts to promote greater trade linkages, rehabilitating infrastructure that can facilitate such linkages and harmonising tax regimes that create a platform for integration through emerging regional institutions – notwithstanding the fact that trade, both formal and informal, are ongoing throughout all phases of insecurity and conflict. While the past decade has seen the implementation of initiatives such as the Kimberley Process targeted at curbing the illegal trade of “conflict resources”, there is also a growing attempt to more proactively promote closer trade cooperation.¹⁶

The DRC, Rwanda and Burundi have historically had strong trade links as they represent a critical transit region in terms of linking the DRC basin to the west with the eastward ports of Kenya and Tanzania. Today these trade links persist, with Eastern DRC representing the biggest export market for various neighbours. Currently there are six main trading corridors, each representing the different ties that the various regions and provinces of the DRC have with different neighbours.¹⁷

The DRC's formal exports are estimated to represent a mere 25–30 percent of all exports.¹⁸ The DRC largely exports primary commodities with little value added, such as timber and minerals, which results in limited state revenue from formal trade. In turn, DRC imports include fuel and machinery, agricultural, industrial mining, and logging products. Existing trade connections have, however, contributed little to the country's development.¹⁹

13 Brown et al., 2005.

14 Ibid.

15 Cited in IISD, Humphreys, *Economics and Violent Conflict*, p.8, also Mansfield, 2003, p.222.

16 Initiatives such as DFID's “Trading for Peace” programme in the Great Lakes Region recognise not only the opportunities for poverty reduction and livelihood promotion through trade but also its potential peacebuilding impacts, especially with respect to the governance implications of reformed management of natural resource exploitation and trade. Trading for Peace is a shared initiative between DFID, COMESA and USAID, with DFID leading on the research strands of the programme (DFID, 2007). Beyond the proliferation of formal bodies that promote greater trade through regional integration and the use of instruments such as free trade areas and harmonised border controls in Central Africa, institutions such as the IC/GLR are founded on the ethos of cooperation and peacebuilding in the region, recognising the key role that economic interdependence, highlighted by cross-border trade, can play in this.

17 DFID, 2007.

18 Tegera and Johnson, 2007.

19 For example, see Forests Monitor, 2007. ‘Timber trade and poverty alleviation in the upper Great Lakes Region’. Available at <http://www.forestsmoitor.org/en/reports/556666>.

Indeed, trade across borders in the region is most often associated with the unregistered and illicit export of natural resources, such as gold and cassiterite from Eastern DRC. The role this trade of natural resources plays in financing activities for armed groups in the region and sustaining conflict has been well documented. Not only do existing structures of natural resource exploitation and trade fuel conflict, they also hamper any attempts to establish processes of development and peacebuilding.²⁰ Indeed, weak governance, socio-economic insecurity and overlapping, cyclical conflicts and war render the equitable management of the DRC's natural resources a distant ideal.

The changing nature of trade routes, exploitative trade patterns and commercial competition between different groups as well as the shifting demand for different resources, issues of corruption, and state collusion in the border regions are all closely tied to conflict dynamics. Yet, from another perspective, informal cross-border trade has continued to flourish throughout periods of intense conflict. Therefore, trade represents – together with its associated value-chains – a critical livelihood throughout the region. Those that are able to profit most often also control the means of violence in a given area.²¹ Furthermore, the suspicions and mistrust between communities often continue to manifest themselves in trading relationships. However, there are also positive dimensions to the varied income sources, such as resilient coping mechanisms and regular interaction between communities that these activities represent. Whether this interdependence and pragmatic cooperation can be harnessed for peacebuilding purposes will greatly depend on the ability to transform existing economic and political relations and structures that are based on exploitative or inequitable exchange.

²⁰ See the UNSC Experts Panel for DRC (2002), which concluded that mineral exploitation was funding various factions in the conflict. Beyond minerals, other resources have also been implicated. For example, timber from the Ituri District was traded with Ugandan business people in exchange for arms and ammunition.


²¹ UNSC Experts Panel on the DRC, 2002; Tegera, 2002; HRW, 2005.

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INITIATIVES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Today, all GL states are members of various Regional Initiatives and Institutions (RIIs), some of them with conflicting agendas and projects.²² Overlapping memberships in RIIs pursuing similar objectives is costly and can drain capacities from other areas of government. It can additionally hinder the full engagement needed to push forward the RII. In the worst case, it may lead to conflicting commitments and regulations, often evident with respect to differential tariff rates or taxation policies (comprehensive information on each RII can be found in the Appendix: Mapping of Regional Initiatives and Institutions in the Great Lakes Region).

MAPPING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INITIATIVES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

FIGURE 1: OVERLAPPING MEMBERSHIP OF RIIS IN THE GLR, ADAPTED FROM THE SPAGHETTI BOWL DEPICTION BY UNECA



Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Union, 2006a.

22 UNECA, 2006a.

Many of the new or revitalised regional institutions that have emerged over the last decade are primarily economic in character. However, the ultimate aims of the RIIs vary between economic objectives, such as common markets (AEC, COMESA), full economic unions (CEPGL, EAC, ECCAS, SADC) and a political union (EAC). Some pursue peacebuilding objectives, such as the establishment of a strategy to bring peace and prosperity to the GLR (IC/GLR) or the elimination of illegal armed groups (TPC); others focus on development goals, such as energy infrastructure and capacities (AFREC, NBI, NEPAD).

Most of the RIIs operate energy, trade and peacebuilding projects simultaneously (see Table 2 and the Appendix).

TABLE 2: THEMES COVERED BY RIIS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM

RII	Energy	Trade	Peacebuilding	Cooperation with other RII/s
AEC	✓	✓	✓	✓
AFREC	✓			✓
NEPAD	✓	✓	✓	✓
EAC	✓	✓	✓	✓
ECCAS	✓	✓	✓	✓
COMESA	✓	✓	✓	✓
SADC	✓	✓	✓	✓
CEPGL	✓	✓	✓	✓
IC/GLR	✓	✓	✓	✓
TPC			✓	
NBI	✓	✓	✓	✓

The AU's African Economic Community recognises 8 of the 14 existing African so-called Regional Economy Communities (RECs) as building blocks towards creating a common market throughout Africa. In 2006, however, the AU declared a moratorium on recognising new RECs given the already existing multiple and overlapping RECs. The RECs have since increased cooperation by signing memoranda of understanding, establishing the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), or the Joint Task Force of EAC, COMESA and SADC in an effort to harmonise their programmes or to avoid duplication and inefficient implementations. While efforts to improve synergies between these bodies are welcome, problems of internal coordination persist as well as varying degrees of cooperation between programmes or projects of different departments within a given RII. As the case studies below highlight, energy projects, for example, are rarely designed jointly across RIIs, let alone with security or peacebuilding units.

EU SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INITIATIVES

The European Union has been an active supporter of various regional cooperation initiatives and institutions in the Great Lakes Region and has positioned itself as a key donor in this respect. Much of the EU's engagement flows from the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which provides a long-term framework of African-EU Partnership and shapes EU donor activities.²³ The strategic framework includes peace and security, trade and regional integration, and key development issues, such as energy. In line with this strategy, the EU identified regional (economic) integration in Africa as a key element in reaching the MDGs, eradicating poverty and fostering development (European Union and African Union 2007). Thus, promoting closer economic linkages is the focus of the EU-African Partnership, which is primarily accomplished through the development of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) within

²³ The Joint Africa-EU Strategy builds on previous agreements, in particular the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 (valid until 2020) which is especially relevant for Central African states and provides a comprehensive framework to address the political, economic, social, cultural and environmental aspects of ACP development; and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and African Regions or African states, which either exist in interim format or are currently being developed.

regional blocks.²⁴ The EU was criticised by prominent figures such as Erastus Mwencha, Secretary-General of COMESA and by various trade experts, saying that the signing of EPAs slows down economic integration and works against the efforts for African unity.²⁵ EPAs, on the other hand, are criticised for creating new divisions as well as for being largely detached from the institutional, political and socio-economic realities on the ground.²⁶ An example in this regard is COMESA, which has been pursuing joint trade deals with the EU under the ESA block, but only 16 of the 19 member states of COMESA are grouped under the ESA block of the EU, marginalising the other 3 and creating obstacles amongst COMESA members. Criticism also comes from the fact that the EU's focus on EPAs ties up major financial resources for other development projects.²⁷ From this perspective, it seems apparent that current EPA negotiations not only neglect, but even duplicate and disrupt existing African regional cooperation initiatives and institutions, thereby also contradicting the goals and ambitions of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

The issue of coherence with respect to the European Union's support for energy, trade and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region is perhaps most evident in its support for regional cooperation. Under the leadership of Louis Michel, the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, the EC has verbally and financially backed the establishment of several bodies in the region designed to promote cooperation, development and peace between states. This policy agenda has been backed by the commitment of significant amounts of money to regional organisations such as the African Union and COMESA. For example, in 2005 the EC signed an agreement to provide €30 million to COMESA as part of the institution's five-year €223 million Regional Integration Support Programme.²⁸ The Commissioner himself has championed the revival of the CEPGL Secretariat, with an initial commitment of €50 million and rhetorical references to the revived institutions' role in establishing peace and security in the region.²⁹ CEPGL's *raison d'être* is not limited to greater trade and economic growth as representatives of the institution also explicitly cite a rationale of supporting the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts.³⁰ Not only is the Secretariat currently developing programmes and soliciting funding for projects focused on economic recovery in the region, but representatives have also taken on diplomatic roles in regional peacebuilding processes, participating in the Goma Conference in January 2008, in Eastern DRC, for example. Likewise, the IC/GLR is a programmatic body and an active force of diplomacy in initiatives such as the Amani Programme.

Whether these initiatives are able to effectively integrate such high-level diplomatic peacebuilding efforts with economic recovery initiatives that connect local populations as constituencies for peace, improve shared economic opportunities and contribute to better relations between communities, remains ambiguous. In order to look at this issue in more depth, this report examines two institutions in the Great Lakes Region supported by the EU and other donor agencies: IC/GLR and CEPGL.

24 The EU's approach to EPAs in and of itself has generated critical reactions: the EU cooperates mainly with five of the eight AU building blocks, namely ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS, EAC and COMESA as well as NEPAD. The EU divides Sub-Saharan Africa in different regional blocks as the AU does, including into Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), SADC, Central Africa and West Africa. However, the EU started to negotiate the EPAs with individual countries and sub-blocks rather than with a whole block. For example, the EAC, which only represents one part of the ESA block, installed an interim EPA with the EU in November 2007.

25 Odhiambo, 2008; Soest, 2008.

26 Soest, 2008; Gündüz et al., 2006.

27 Kabuleeta and Hanson, 2007.

28 Cited in Brown et al. 2005, the RISP runs from 2002–2007.

29 Louis Michel cited in EuropaWorld, 2007.

30 Council of the European Union, 'Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa', SN 1010/04, January 2004, p.3.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION (IC/GLR)

BOX 1

IC/GLR in brief

Approach: The IC/GLR aims to strengthen peacebuilding processes in the Great Lakes Region and seeks to address economic issues in the region as a means of achieving this aim.

Objective: The key objective of the IC/GLR, established in 2004, is to build a regional framework for consultations structured around the Pact on Security, Stability and Development (adopted by member states in 2006).

The Pact is based on **four priority areas:** Peace and Security, Democracy and Good Governance, Economic Development and Regional Integration as well as Humanitarian and Social Issues. This reflects the premise that peace and security will not exist without good governance, economic reconstruction and development, or without resolution of issues of impunity, displacement, land rights and sexual violence. Specifically, the Pact also aims to facilitate the return of refugees as well as the repatriation of fighting forces that have crossed borders, an issue that is highly contested between Rwanda and the DRC.

Member states: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Budget: The Conference's budget comes from contributions from member states as well as pooled finances from its so-called "Group of Friends", composed of various donor agencies offering financial as well as technical and political support. In 2006, the IC/GLR had already garnered more than US\$10 million in contributions (Sebahara, 2006).

Achievements and activities

Following Security Council resolutions stating the importance of a regional conference supporting the efforts of the UN and the AU in building peace in the Great Lakes Region, the IC/GLR has come to represent a forum where member states can enter into dialogue with each other, especially when other channels remain too political.

In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the Rwandan and Congolese governments, both have used the space created by IC/GLR to discuss issues of mutual concern.³¹ The IC/GLR also played a prominent role at the Goma Conference in January 2008, although follow-up action and implementation of the accords signed has been less evident. One promising dynamic of the IC/GLR is the DRC government's willingness to engage and contribute to the Conference's activities. Indeed, the DRC and Rwanda were the only governments to have paid their membership contributions at the time of writing. However, continuing conflict in Eastern DRC has put into question the government's ability and willingness to implement either security or regional economic integration planning commitments under the IC/GLR.

The IC/GLR's approach to regional integration is based on encouraging cooperation between relevant RECs in the implementation of regional projects: multiple memberships of countries to several sub-regional economic organisations can constitute an obstacle rather than a benefit to regional economic cooperation and integration policies. Projects and activities under the economic development sub-programme of action include efforts to re-establish the CEPGL, an initiative being championed by the EU (see section on "CEPGL"). As stated: 'Reviving the Economic Community of Countries in the Great Lakes (CEPGL) seems like an avenue for not only offering solutions to economic and social problems of these countries but also for restoring peace and security in the sub-region'.³²

³¹ Personal communication with IC/GLR staff member.

³² *Ibid.*, p.5.

Trade issues figure predominantly in the pillar on economic development and regional integration. Indeed this sub-programme of action includes the establishment of a regional mechanism for the certification of natural resources aimed at curbing their illegal exploitation and trade in the region. It also aims to promote the sustainable management of such resources within and between countries in the Great Lakes Region. However, such trade-related priorities remain preliminary at this stage, with decisions yet to be taken on the particular minerals or resources that would be included under the proposed certification scheme, for instance. Likewise, plans for infrastructure rehabilitation and the establishment of different trans-boundary "corridors" in order to better facilitate trade and recovery in the region also remain hypothetical, especially with continued instability in the region.

As part of this push for economic growth and regional integration by the IC/GLR, there is also a proposed energy-related project designed to extract the methane gas in Lake Kivu for use within the Great Lakes Region. While Rwanda has already invested significantly on this front and built a pilot platform in the lake, there remains hope that this endeavour could be one undertaken cooperatively between the Rwandan and the DRC governments. At the moment, SOCIGAZ, a joint venture between the DRC and Rwanda, is tasked with overseeing the exploitation of the gas under Lake Kivu. While there have been some bilateral workshops and information-sharing activities, the initiative falls short of actual joint-management of the resource and a common energy project.³³ IC/GLR is proposing to undertake a full feasibility study on gas usage on a larger scale and would seek to incorporate closer joint management of such an initiative. Given the advanced state of Rwanda's efforts on this front and the fact that the DRC has given a lower priority to this project, however, it seems unlikely that the IC/GLR would be able to address the imbalance between the two government's capacities to engage. Furthermore, the perception that Rwanda is taking advantage of a shared resource is present on the Congolese side of the border and demonstrates the sensitivity of such issues for communities as well as governments.³⁴ If substantial amounts of methane gas are exploited unilaterally, it can further feed mistrust and suspicion at all levels. The case of methane presents a typical dilemma of such shared and unmarked resources. On the other hand, a transparent, cooperative approach to exploitation could ideally contribute to peacebuilding through increased energy interdependence at governmental levels and better energy provision at local levels for both sides.

Conclusion

The ambition for the proposed areas of action of the IC/GLR is daunting. The economic development and regional integration pillar is one of several aspects to the IC/GLR's proposed work, but is by itself already huge in its scale and scope. The others pillars of peace and security, humanitarian issues and good governance are part of the conference's envisioned work and are equally as ambitious, if not more politically sensitive. The repatriation of refugees, for example, remains a hotly contested issue between the Rwandan and Congolese governments. The willingness on the part of member states to implement such agreements and programmes remains in question.³⁵ Without member states taking ownership and prioritising or streamlining the heavily overloaded agenda of IC/GLR, the initiative risks becoming a diplomatic talking shop with little or no tangible results on the ground.

Furthermore, the degree to which the pillars of action are integrated remains limited. Thus the proposed common border security zones do not offer any links to proposed trade and energy projects, as outlined under the economic development pillar. The actual design of the programmes remains within their respective silos of action, meaning that synergies between pillars and opportunities for drawing on different types of technical expertise will likely be missed.

The Conference additionally needs to actively and effectively engage more with civil society groups and the communities where it is working. The ability to carry out a project such as the proposed common border security zones could build on existing local economic activities across such borders, for instance. Further, such local engagement would assist in identifying potential conflict risks in a contested and politicised context, including cross-border trade and shared energy projects.

³³ SOCIGAZ was originally founded under the framework of CEPGL (see below). While there have been bilateral consultations, Rwanda has begun piloting the exploitation of the methane gas based on a 1999 reform of the SOCIGAZ mandate that allows both states to assign concessions for their territory (Doevenspeck, 2007: 101–103).

³⁴ Interviews, June 2008.

³⁵ Sebahara, 2006.

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF THE GREAT LAKES COUNTRIES (CEPGL)

Box 2

CEPGL in brief

Approach: CEPGL aims to strengthen economic cooperation in the Great Lakes Region and to facilitate more stable and peaceful relations through this cooperation.

Objective: The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries was originally founded in 1976, but collapsed in the mid-1990s due to conflicts within and between the member states. In 2007, it was re-launched under the umbrella of IC/GLR (Project No. 3.2.1). CEPGL was originally designed as an economic cooperation organisation, but the recently re-established Secretariat is forming a more explicit mandate with respect to governance and peacebuilding.

CEPGL's current **five priorities** are:

- Peace and security, democracy and good governance;
- Agriculture and food security;
- Energy, infrastructure and communication;
- Education and research; and
- Investments.

To achieve its objectives, the CEPGL is further endowed with **four specialist bodies**:

- The Energy Organisation of the Great Lakes Countries (**EGL**).
EGL's main objective is to ensure cooperation between the member states in the energy sector. It serves as a planning and research body and also ensures project implementation.
- The International Great Lakes Energy Company (**SINELAC**).
SINELAC is a joint venture of Electrogaz, Rwanda's state-owned electricity supplier, Burundi's Régie de Production et Distribution d'Eau et d'Electricité (Regideso) and the Congolese Société Nationale d'Électricité (SNEL). Its purpose is to run the community hydroelectric power station of Ruzizi II as well as to market the energy produced in the three member states through their national electricity companies. Currently, SINELAC is the only properly functioning organisation within CEPGL.
- The Development Bank of the Great Lakes Countries (**BDEGL**).
- The Institute for Agriculture and Livestock Research (**IRAZ**).

Member States: Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda.

Budget: US\$138,007,354 (indicative budget for the revival of CEPGL 2006-2010).

Achievements and activities

In its first phase, CEPGL succeeded in enabling the free movement of people and the joint management of the hydroelectric dam Ruzizi II.³⁶ Both initiatives are still functioning: the joint CEPGL identity card continues to ease the cross-border flow of people and trade, and the dam is still producing electricity, though at a reduced capacity. Trade and energy enhancements were therefore key outcomes of CEPGL, until its collapse in the 1990s. CEPGL's re-launch in 2007 was heavily promoted by the international community, trying to build upon the positive outcomes of CEPGL's first phase and the continuing cooperation in the energy sector as well as attempting to fix broken ties between the member states. Nevertheless, CEPGL is hindered by several obstacles, foremost divergences between its member states and lack of political will as well as reduced institutional capacities to fully engage in such fora.

As CEPGL is an intergovernmental institution, its successes or failures are heavily dependent upon the behaviour and strategy of the governments involved. At the time of writing, the DRC had not yet seconded their delegates to the CEPGL executive secretariat in Gisenyi, thereby relegating all activity of the existing staff from Burundi and Rwanda to a preliminary status. The DRC was the key driver and funder of CEPGL during its first phase

³⁶ Stevens, Hoebke and Vlassenroot, 2008.

of existence. While the launch of the second phase of CEPGL's existence saw all parties agreeing to equitable burden sharing in terms of budgets, many in the region continue to perceive the initiative to be primarily of interest to Burundi and particularly Rwanda, given the internal political economy dynamics of the DRC. For example, electricity from the Ruzizi dams is mainly fed into the national grids of Burundi and Rwanda and primarily benefits the Eastern DRC. Similarly, cross-border trade primarily benefits the Kivus, with little perceived benefit for the government in Kinshasa to move beyond a nominal engagement. The recent conflicts between the DRC and Rwanda as well as the ongoing violence in the Kivus represent a challenge to renewed cooperation. The countries do not uphold formal diplomatic representation and meetings on the highest political level are very rare. Burundi and Rwanda's joining the EAC (an Anglophone institution) in 2007 further complicates matters for CEPGL, bringing with it issues of overlapping regional cooperation and integration mechanisms as well as further entrenching the eastward-looking perspective of the two countries (see section "Mapping Regional Institutions and Initiatives in the Great Lakes Region"). As for the DRC, the country is split into three geographically regions, each focusing on a different regional cooperation. The eastern perspective is, and will continue to be, the most natural tendency for the Eastern DRC. Thus, the decentralisation of the DRC entails the necessity but also the risk of special attention to the interests and needs of the eastern provinces. One example is the accessibility of seaports (Mombasa and Dar es Salaam) for import and export trade, to which EAC member states, such as Rwanda or Uganda, progressively improve their access compared to Eastern DRC.

CEPGL is receiving considerable support from the international community. The European Commission allocated €50 million for the re-establishment of the Secretariat; the IC/GLR declared the re-launch of CEPGL as one of their top priorities (see section on "IC/GLR"). UNECA assured technical assistance and several other international organisations, such as the World Bank, and bilateral donors, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, are supporting CEPGL as well. IC/GLR states that 'The revival of the CEPGL should be considered a decisive step towards the stabilisation and development process in the whole of the Great Lakes Region'.³⁷ Indeed the latest reincarnation of CEPGL represents a revival of its priority economic programmes as well as the establishment of CEPGL's instruments to promote peace and security. Against this background, the new CEPGL has a strong security pillar. Joint border patrols are planned, but currently lie under the responsibility of the Tripartite Plus Commission and the joint monitoring mechanisms that the UN Mission MONUC has set up between the DRC and Rwanda. Therefore, in light of the lack of political ownership by all member states, it is highly questionable that CEPGL should be the right institution to additionally tackle core security and "hard" peacebuilding topics.

Conclusion

CEPGL points to two significant previous achievements that persisted throughout conflict and war in the region, while other areas of work floundered.³⁸ The measures put in place to allow for the free passage of people and goods across the three countries' borders continued and trade in the region provides a critical source for livelihoods. Likewise, SINELAC also continued operating and running the hydro dam Ruzizi II with ongoing cooperation, which largely reflects Burundi, Rwanda and the Eastern DRC's dependence on electricity from SINELAC.

However, the DRC government is attempting to improve control of its borders and there are first signs that this might curtail freedom of movement for Eastern Congolese activities in small-scale cross-border trade. Moreover, technical cooperation between the parties did not seemingly lead to impacts at the diplomatic and political levels, either during the conflict or in the current transition phase. Indeed, the DRC has not yet sent representatives to the CEPGL Secretariat, which serves to exemplify the lack of political commitment to the institution's aims and the ongoing hostilities between member governments which should be at the core of attention. Thus, while technical meetings regarding SINELAC's operations and the reform of its management are taking place, broader cooperation under the umbrella of CEPGL's EGL remains difficult and the willingness from Congolese governmental authorities to engage with the institution and its aims remains obscure.

Disengagement by member states and the seeming absence of high-level diplomatic or political impacts must be considered in the institutions' programming and the way in which donors offer their technical, financial and diplomatic support. While both energy provision and trade as facilitated by CEPGL and its organs support

³⁷ International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 2006b.

³⁸ The CEPGL's financial institution (BDEGL), for example, ceased operations after running out of money.

livelihoods and offer economic opportunities locally, CEPGL should build upon these achievements to maximise peacebuilding impacts. The absence of Congolese representatives in the Secretariat has repercussions not only in diplomatic terms, but it also hinders the ability of the institution to effectively and jointly represent its constituencies and support confidence-building.

CEPGL is mainly a donor-driven institution with little support within the power structures of the three member states. Thus, whether CEPGL will actually be able to support sustainable peace in the region remains a question of political will: '...it seems doubtful that the CEPGL can be effectively restored without a fundamental change of political positions of its member states'.³⁹ Member states' ownership for CEPGL will be further tested soon when the EC funding, currently sustaining the Secretariat and various feasibility studies, runs out and the organisation becomes reliant on membership fees.

³⁹ Stevens, Hoebeke and Vlassenroot, 2008.

PEACEBUILDING CHALLENGES

The ambiguous relationship between regional cooperation and peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region is evident in both CEPGL and IC/GLR. Both claim to have peacebuilding aspects to their work and both are supported and pushed by donor agencies. Despite the rhetoric however, the actual ability of such regional cooperation efforts to actively take into account conflict risks and act on peacebuilding opportunities remains open to question. In order to ensure that the promotion of regional cooperation actually does contribute to better relations between countries as well as communities, improve economic opportunities for citizens and communities, and support peacebuilding, more needs to be done both by the member states of such institutions as well as by donor governments.

The instability in the region as well as the remaining hostilities and mistrust between the governments in the Great Lakes Region, especially between the DRC and Rwanda, poses great challenges for regional cooperation and peacebuilding. In the donors' drive to foster regional institution-building, this challenge must become the focus of all areas of planning and action, adapting different strategies depending on whether disengagement is due to a lack of willingness or capacity, or both. The Congolese government's continued disengagement with CEPGL, for instance, cannot be treated as an aside by the member states as well as by the donor governments, but must be taken seriously and addressed.

Burundi and the DRC are highly fragile states, requiring capacity support to enable them to fulfil their commitments. Rwanda struggles equally with capacity challenges as well as with internal, intergroup tensions. This does not mean that joint political initiatives accompanying the ongoing local transboundary activities are fruitless. Rather, effective joint activity should continue with the objective of benefitting local populations with opportunities and services, for example by improving power supply in the region through a reformed and strengthened SINELAC.

The asymmetries between economies in the region and the different abilities of governments to cope with and mitigate potentially negative effects on livelihoods in the short and long term are further challenges to institutions such as IC/GLR and CEPGL. The ability of governments to harness human and financial resources to assess and act on such adversity remains extremely limited. The Burundian government, for example, is driving accession into the EAC while at the same time trying to address the consequences of traders and farmers facing vastly different markets. This is pertinent given the weakness of Burundi's economy relative to that of the Rwandan economy, or the sheer size of the market represented by the DRC's economy. The changes brought about through cooperation facilitated by an institution like CEPGL should not be discounted in conflict-affected environments. Indeed, it will be difficult for the poorer, conflict-affected and more fragile countries to cope with and mitigate the rising inequality, underemployment and job loss that often accompany economic transitions, especially in the short term. Economic shocks, such as coffee price drops, have been shown to increase tensions and facilitate violence re-emerging in already fragile situations, and market integrations can similarly shock unprepared economies. Much support is required by these governments to adequately deal with the shifting economic and wider power relations that economic cooperation can bring.

The ability of regional institutions to foster economic cooperation as well as support peace is also closely connected to their ability to address local needs, build on local resilience and operate in consultative, transparent ways. The ability of the IC/GLR, for instance, to engage with civil society in the region in systematic ways that involve planning and monitoring of programmes and projects at local, national and regional levels is critical. Dedicated, long-term capacity building and accompaniment may be able to support such efforts as can generating consultative approaches that incorporate the perspectives of civil society, including the local private sector. EU

support in this area would not only avoid the pitfalls of feeding further into conflict dynamics but also reinforce 'local capacities for peace'.⁴⁰

Institutions such as CEPGL and IC/GLR need to articulate how they will ensure assumed peacebuilding impacts, and how they will assess interventions and their impacts from this perspective. In this perspective, a critical review of existing structures of both institutions is necessary. A network of working groups with representatives from the different executive bodies may be a more appropriate forum to address different challenges than within a formal institution. Moreover, it is crucial to include further stakeholders, such as representatives of border provinces, and spread responsibilities. Donors such as the EU should help strengthen institutional capacity in this regard and ensure linkages and coordination across institutional pillars that work on economic development, security and peacebuilding. This includes analysis and assessment at all levels of engagement, from high-level diplomatic activities to those that support the creation of local economic opportunities.

Such peacebuilding approaches must be actively incorporated into the fundraising and planning of economic, trade or energy projects to have a benchmark of its ability to incorporate conflict-sensitivity and capitalise on peacebuilding opportunities.⁴¹ Donor agencies themselves have amassed a wealth of policies and experiences in this regard that should be shared with institutional partners.

Regional approaches to peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region are critical and the economic dimensions of such cooperation represent a strategic entry point given their role in supporting peace as well as their potential for creating shared interest and improving the human security of the region's people. What emerging institutions such as IC/GLR and the supporting donor agencies need to do now, however, is to act on opportunities that exist and add value to peacebuilding efforts through the economic aspects of cooperation they champion.

⁴⁰ Anderson, 1996.

⁴¹ OECD, 2008.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are recommendations regarding regional cooperation in the Great Lakes Region.

The European Commission and other donors should integrate conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches into efforts to promote regional cooperation on energy and trade.

The regional dimension of the Great Lakes conflicts – past and present – requires regional peacebuilding strategies. This report makes clear that peacebuilding is not an automatic result of regional cooperation. Instead of technical cooperation and local trade networks having positive spill-over effects at the political level, a lack of political cooperation can impede technical solutions and cooperation that can foster livelihood and human security. Different mechanisms of political engagement, such as regular dialogue, joint planning and ongoing consultations that strategically link trade and energy cooperation to peacebuilding, should therefore be systematically exploited. Conflict-sensitive approaches, including broad stakeholder consultations and transparent decision-making must be ensured.

The European Commission and other donors should strategically select which regional cooperation efforts to support.

Similar and even identical regional cooperation projects are taken forward by multiple regional cooperation institutions. This creates multiple levels of overhead, which is both costly and inefficient in realising the programmes and projects. Donors should ensure that they do not contribute to such overlap. This can be accomplished by prioritising institutions that already exist and that have developed and tested approaches for stakeholder engagement and conflict sensitivity.

The European Commission and other donors should encourage selected regional cooperation to ensure institutional effectiveness.

The success in reaching a cooperation's objectives depends to a great extent on the institutional design and processes. The political, social and economic conditions in the Great Lakes Region are very complex. Flexible and targeted institutional structures incorporate this complexity. Lean bureaucratic structures (using secondments or inter-ministerial working groups), the engagement of additional stakeholders across all political and societal levels, as well as vital communication and working relations, build the foundation to meet these challenges.

Recommendations regarding IC/GLR

For economic cooperation and peacebuilding to become mutually reinforcing in IC/GLR's work, the Conference needs to refine its mandate and areas of engagement in light of the instability and capacity of governments in the region through the following ways:

- In the economic cooperation pillar alone, large-scale infrastructure projects can represent highly contested resources worth fighting over. Further, initiatives such as a natural resource certification scheme risk duplicating efforts at the international level, which are already proving costly and often ineffective. The added value of the IC/GLR's engagement in such activities must be better articulated. IC/GLR would be better off focusing on more security-related issues, or at least collaborating with the Tripartite Plus mechanism.
- The pillars of the IC/GLR need to be more effectively integrated. The humanitarian pillar must take into account planned actions in the economic cooperation and development pillar, for instance. The overriding aim of peacebuilding must be articulated across pillars, with impact assessments reflecting such priorities.
- IC/GLR can represent an acceptable space where governments such as the DRC and Rwanda feel able to enter into dialogue on issues, where other diplomatic avenues may be closed. This has confidence-

building potential. Such diplomatic efforts must however also be matched by action. Following the IC/GLR's visible presence at the Goma conference in 2008, for instance, it must now work hard to follow through on commitments.

- Donor support should seek to rationalise the broad spectrum of the IC/GLR's planned areas of engagement and assist the Secretariat in identifying priorities for stabilisation, cooperation and peacebuilding in the region. This would need to be based on a mapping and good understanding of existing local initiatives already in place that can be strengthened and built upon.

Recommendations regarding CEPGL

The key challenge remains the engagement of the DRC in the CEPGL's Secretariat, something that will not occur easily or quickly. The recommendations made here are to be considered in this light:

- Political stalemate will be overcome only if the apprehensions of all are recognised and addressed, and benefits from cooperation appear equal or at least mutual. Options of bringing Uganda and other parties on board for specific programmes – if not for joining the institution – should be explored as this may make cooperation more palatable to the DRC's government, given its engagement in other regional organisations with multiple memberships.
- The enlargement of the stakeholders' group could minimise dependence on the willingness and capacities of governmental actors. The existence of positive cooperation on sub-national levels highlights this assumption. CEPGL's structure should be revised and made more flexible to also engage on issues related other actors, e.g. the DRC eastern provinces authorities or local trade organisations.
- Instead of reviving all of the old CEPGL organisations, a niche and strategic benefit of CEPGL should be identified and exploited. CEPGL should look more towards strictly economic issues, to prevent the risk of duplication of efforts in the field of security. In this respect, it would make sense to focus on CEPGL's only operational area of energy cooperation. The division of labour between CEPGL, EGL and SINELAC should be revised in view of current plans for new investments. A leaner, effective energy cooperation institution should continue to support tripartite technical cooperation and keep dialogue channels open.
- With new investments in SINELAC and joint hydro-power dams imminent, CEPGL could benefit from cooperating with organisations that have developed systematic stakeholder involvement as well as social and environmental impact assessment methods, such as NELSAP.

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APPENDIX: MAPPING OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND INITIATIVES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	African Economic Community AEC – AU
<i>Established</i>	1994
<i>General description</i>	The Abuja Treaty seeks to create the AEC within the AU framework through six stages culminating in an African common market using eight RECs as building blocks. The building blocks are: UMA, ECCAS, COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and CEN-SAD.
<i>Energy</i>	Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment.
<i>Trade</i>	Overall objective: Establishment of a common market. Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters.
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	Objective: Foster close and peaceful relations among member states. Principle: Peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, active cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a pre-requisite for economic development.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	53 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs (1998): Instrument and framework for close cooperation, programme harmonisation and coordination, as well as integration among the RECs and between the AEC and the RECs.
<i>Comments</i>	Moratorium on the recognition of Regional Economic Communities from the AU (2006): Suspension of the recognition of new RECs (exception: AEC building blocks).

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	African Energy Commission AFREC – AU
<i>Established</i>	2008
<i>General description</i>	AFREC would be the official energy arm of the AU and would be a continental African structure with the responsibility to ensure, co-ordinate and harmonise the protection, preservation, development and the national exploitation, marketing and integration of the energy resources of the African continent.
<i>Energy</i>	There are four core programmes of the AFREC Action Plan: Information system, capacity building and technical assistance, advocacy and facilitation, and energy efficiency. Countries would undertake the Capacity Building and Facilitation Projects with support from AFREC in collaboration with RECs.
<i>Trade</i>	Principle: Promotion of trade and technical assistance in energy among member states. Function: Develop trade and transit of energy goods and services among member states, particularly through the identification and removal of barriers.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	53 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	The Technical Advisory Body would comprise the RECs, Joint Secretariat of the OAU/ ECA/AfDB/UN agencies operating in the energy sector such as UNEP, UNDP, UNDESA, UNIDO, FAO and UNESCO, as well as relevant regional and sub-regional entities dealing with energy such as the WEC. For financial and technical advice, AFREC expects to draw on the expertise of NEPAD, AFUR, AfDB, IEA, OPEC, EU, WB, among others.
<i>Comments</i>	The EU's cooperation with AFREC would focus in particular on financing the supply of sustainable energy to remote and isolated regions of the continent.

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
<i>Established</i>	1993
<i>General description</i>	<p>Member states have agreed to promote regional integration through trade development and to develop their natural and human resources for the mutual benefit of all their peoples.</p> <p>COMESA has programmes in trade and transport facilitation, trade in services, free movement of persons and investment. Cross-cutting areas and other issues include gender policy, conflict prevention and a COMESA Court of Justice.</p>
<i>Energy</i>	<p>An energy programme is soon to be established. A study on the status of energy in the COMESA region has identified that energy policy and regulatory harmonisation, development of regional energy infrastructure, joint procurement of petroleum products and trade in electricity, should be the main priority focus areas that the regional energy programme addresses.</p> <p>The East African Power Pool (EAPP) was launched in February 2005 with the signing of memoranda of understanding by member countries of COMESA and NBI.</p>
<i>Trade</i>	<p>The objective of cooperation in trade, customs and monetary affairs is to achieve a fully integrated, internationally competitive and unified single economic space within which goods, services, capital and labour are able to move freely across national frontiers. The programme of cooperation aims to achieve the removal of all physical, technical, fiscal and monetary barriers to intra-regional trade and commercial exchanges.</p> <p>COMESA launched its Free Trade Area in 2000 and is preparing to establish its Customs Union.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	<p>COMESA considers the future development of its programme for peace and security in the areas of: early warning systems, conflict management, conflict resolution and post-conflict transformation. COMESA is coordinating and complementing its efforts with other sub-regional groupings such as IGAD and SADC in the area of peace and security to avoid duplication of efforts and institutional rivalry.</p> <p>COMESA, hand in hand with IGAD and EAC, is in the process of developing a regional framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) in order to respond to obtaining and potential conflict situations in the region.</p>
<i>No of members/ GL-members</i>	<p>19 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda</p>
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>The major donor is EC. Other funding agencies/donors include USAID, World Bank, DfID, France, ACBF, ComSec, AfDB and UN Agencies.</p> <p>Memoranda of understanding have been signed with EAC, IGAD and IOC such that these organisations have agreed to adopt and implement the COMESA trade liberalisation and facilitation programme. These RECs are working together in the framework of the Interregional Coordination Committee (IRCC) with the objective of achieving programme harmonisation and convergence so as to expedite the realisation of the African Economic Community. COMESA, EAC and SADC have set up a joint task force.</p> <p>EAPP with NBI.</p> <p>COMESA is supporting IC/GLR.</p>
<i>Comments</i>	Building block of AEC.

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	East African Community (EAC)
<i>Established</i>	1967/2000
<i>General description</i>	<p>The primary objective is the construction of a common East African identity within the vision of a fully integrated East Africa.</p> <p>The EAC countries established a customs union in 2005 and are working towards the establishment of a common market, subsequently a monetary union and ultimately a political federation of the East African States.</p>
<i>Energy</i>	<p>East African master power plan for a full-fledged Regional Power System. The plan will cover power generation and transmission projects.</p> <p>East African Petroleum Conference in the Energy sector (EAPC): evaluation of the gas and oil potential in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.</p>
<i>Trade</i>	<p>The principal components of the customs union agreement are a common external tariff on imports from third countries, duty-free trade between the EAC member states and common customs procedures.</p> <p>The EAC has on stream a substantial complement of measures, projects and programmes, including the EAC private sector development strategy, EAC model investment code, EAC joint export and investment promotion strategy and the EAC competition law and policy to ease trade and investments flow.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	<p>Peacebuilding-related achievements of EAC: Sectoral Committee on Cooperation in Defense, Inter-State Security Committee, memorandum of understanding for cooperation in defense matters within an elaborate programme of activities, largely of confidence building among the defense forces and signing the Pact of Security, Stability and Development of IC/GLR.</p> <p>CPMR see COMESA.</p>
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	<p>5</p> <p>Joined 2007: Burundi, Rwanda</p>
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>The EAC takes part in EU-ACP, AGOA, WTO, NEPAD, IC/GLR.</p> <p>Economic Partnership Agreement with EU in 2007.</p> <p>Technical and financial assistance from international aid and development agencies, including WB, EU, EIB, AfDB, SIDA, UNECA, GTZ, EADB, DFID, NORAD and DANIDA.</p> <p>The EAC has close working relationships with COMESA, SADC and IGAD to forge a close alliance in minimising the dysfunctions of dual or multiple memberships in regional economic organisations. EAC is participating in CPMR (further information see COMESA). Joint task force with COMESA and SADC.</p> <p>EAC signed a memorandum of understanding with NBI.</p>
<i>Comments</i>	<p>Building block of AEC.</p> <p>Discussions have been undertaken on “fast tracking” the political federation.</p>

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
<i>Established</i>	1983
<i>General description</i>	<p>Organisation for promotion of regional economic cooperation in Central Africa. It aims to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its populations and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation. Its ultimate goal is to establish a Central African Common Market.</p> <p>The reinstatement/mission of ECCAS includes focusing on promoting peace, security and stability in Central Africa.</p>
<i>Energy</i>	Central African Power Pool (CAPP) with the aim of establishing a subregional forum for resolving energy problems and creating an electricity market.
<i>Trade</i>	<p>Establishment of a customs union was planned for 2008. Protocols have been adopted for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and for the implementation of trade enhancement programmes.</p> <p>ECCAS officially declared in 2004 the establishment of a Free Trade Area, but the legal enforcements are still in the process of implementation.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	<p>Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) aims to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in Central Africa. COPAX entered into force in January 2004. The COPAX Protocol set up: The Multinational Peace Keeping Force in Central Africa (FOMAC), the Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System for Central Africa (MARAC) and the Defense and Security Commission (CDS).</p> <p>ECCAS is responsible for the development of the Central African Standby Force.</p> <p>In 2003, the EU concluded a financial agreement with ECCAS and CEMAC, conditional on ECCAS and CEMAC merging into one organisation, with ECCAS taking responsibility for peace and security of the sub-region through its security pact COPAX.</p>
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	<p>10</p> <p>Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda left in 2007</p>
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>Some of the ECCAS states have formed the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) in 1999. The European Union concluded a financial agreement with ECCAS and CEMAC in 2003, conditional on ECCAS and CEMAC merging into one organisation.</p> <p>Assistance from UNECA.</p>
<i>Comments</i>	<p>Building block of AEC.</p> <p>ECCAS has been dormant for almost a decade, but has recently been resuscitated, but still the economic integration achievements remain little.</p>

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)
<i>Established</i>	1976/2007
<i>General description</i>	The priorities are peace and security, democracy and good governance; agriculture and food security; energy, infrastructure and communication; education and research; investments.
<i>Energy</i>	<p>The focus of CEPGL is on energy programmes, managed through the Energy Organisation of the Great Lakes Countries (EGL; shall ensure cooperation between the member states in the energy sector); the International Great Lakes Energy Company (SINELAC; runs the Community's hydroelectric power station of Ruzizi II and markets the energy produced in the three member states); and the Commercial and Industrial Gas Company (SOCIGAZ; shall be responsible for controlling exploitation, concessions and license fees)</p> <p>Currently, SINELAC is the only properly functioning organisation within CEPGL.</p>
<i>Trade</i>	<p>In its first phase, CEPGL developed the CEPGL card, enabling free movement of people and goods.</p> <p>After its re-launch, economic development is a key priority, but there are no specific programmes yet.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	Peacebuilding is part of the focus of CEPGL. The idea of the renewal of CEPGL is to foster peace through cooperation.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	3 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda
<i>Partners/Donors</i>	<p>International partners and financial/technical support: EC, WB, UNECA, Belgium and Netherlands.</p> <p>The re-launch of CEPGL was promoted by Belgium and IC/GLR.</p>

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR)
<i>Established</i>	2004
<i>General description</i>	The Conference was established as a means of supporting UN and AU efforts at brokering a regional peace in the Great Lakes. It aims to launch a process of dialogue and consultation in order for member states to come to agreement on principles and programmes related to stability, peace and economic development in the region. The Conference's defining instrument is the Pact on Security, Stability and Development (2006)
<i>Energy</i>	ICGLR supports the revival of CEPGL, and its energy-related projects (see above) as well as the exploitation of methane gas from Lake Kivu, the establishment of the Inga dam in the DRC etc.
<i>Trade</i>	Within its pillar on economic development and regional integration, the ICGLR plans to rehabilitate key infrastructure, including road and rail, so as to facilitate trade in the region. It also aims to establish a regional mechanism for the certification of natural resources in order to curb their illegal exploitation and trade in the region.
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	The IC/GLR's objective is, through dialogue and consultation, to establish a process that seeks to articulate a common vision and strategy for security, peace and development in the GLR.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	11 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	The ICGLR's Group of Friends is composed of various donor agencies seeking to support the institution's work. Friends include Germany, Canada and Belgium amongst numerous others.

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	New Partnership for Africa's Development NEPAD – AU
<i>Established</i>	2001
<i>General description</i>	Economic development programme of the African Union that aims to provide an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic cooperation and integration among African countries.
<i>Energy</i>	The priority is building and improving infrastructure, including energy. NEPAD has energy-related programmes (e.g. PAIDF), projects in cooperation with the AEC building blocks and it assists in putting into place the necessary energy institutions, frameworks, structures, policies and strategies to further public-private partnerships for development of the energy sector.
<i>Trade</i>	The priorities are promoting diversification of production and exports, accelerating intra-African trade and improving access to markets of developed countries, and mobilising resources by improving Africa's share in global trade.
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	The priority is to establish the conditions for sustainable development by ensuring peace and security, democracy and good political, economic and corporate governance. Principle: Good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	53 (no of steering committee members: 19) Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda (steering committee member: Rwanda)
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	The priority is to strengthen the capacity of and linkages among the RECs. Further Partners: WB, G8, EC, UNECA, ADB, DBSA, ACBF, IDC, Office of the UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, private sector.

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
<i>Established</i>	1999
<i>General description</i>	<p>Riparian states of the Nile established the NBI to pursue cooperative development, share substantial socio-economic benefits, and promote regional integration.</p> <p>The NBI consists of three main programmes: The Shared Vision Program (SVP), the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). NELSAP is an investment programme, its mission is to help reduce poverty, promote economic growth, and reverse environmental degradation.</p>
<i>Energy</i>	<p>NELSAP's programme Power Development and Trade includes the Indicative Power Master Plan (2005): Set of "best evaluated" power generation options and transmission interconnection projects, including social and environmental concerns.</p> <p>The Strategic Social and Environmental Assessment of Power Options (SSEA) of NELSAP offers an overview analysis of major regional power development options and regional transmission interconnections.</p> <p>The Nile Basin regional power trade project within SVP is a project working to establish institutions that can develop regional power markets among the Nile Basin countries.</p> <p>SVP's socio-economic development and benefit-sharing project: Examination of the broad benefits envisaged from the NBI and poverty alleviation. One of the research areas is energy.</p>
<i>Trade</i>	<p>Objective: To target poverty eradication and promote economic integration.</p> <p>SVP's socio-economic development and benefit sharing project: One of the research areas is cross-border trade.</p> <p>NELSAP's regional agricultural trade and productivity project: Goal is to contribute to pro-poor growth in the Nile Basin by increasing agricultural trade and productivity.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	<p>The NBI seeks promote regional peace and security.</p> <p>The objective is to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security and peace for all its peoples.</p>
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	<p>10 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda</p>
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>Donors: International financial institutions – such as WB, GEF, AfDB – as well as Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the EU and various UN agencies such as UNDP and the FAO. Donors of the Nile Basin Trust Fund: Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.</p>

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
<i>Established</i>	1992
<i>General description</i>	<p>SADC, formally known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was born out of the positive experiences of closer cooperation among the governments and peoples of Southern Africa.</p> <p>The ultimate objective of SADC is to build a region in which there will be a high degree of harmonisation and rationalisation to enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the region.</p>
<i>Energy</i>	<p>The SADC Energy Protocol, the Policy and Strategy and the SADC Energy Action Plan are the guidelines for the future development of SADC Energy Sector activities.</p> <p>The objective of the South African Power Pool (SAPP) is to create a common market for electricity in the SADC region.</p> <p>In 2008, the SADC Energy Ministerial Task Force (EMTF) adopted a roadmap to accelerate the region's recovery from power shortages through ensuring the effective connectivity of the interconnectors, as well as supply side and demand side management initiatives.</p>
<i>Trade</i>	<p>SADC includes the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA), a customs union, a common market, a monetary union and a single currency.</p> <p>The Trade Protocol contributes towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross border and foreign investment. For this to happen, policy and institutional reforms are undertaken to create an enabling environment for trade.</p> <p>The overall objective of Trade, Industry, Mining, Finance and Investment (TIFI) is to facilitate and coordinate trade and financial liberalisation, competitive and diversified industrial and mining development and increased investment towards deeper regional integration and poverty eradication in the SADC region.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	<p>The general objective of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDS) is to promote peace and security in the region.</p> <p>The SADC brigade is a regional multidimensional peace support operations capability. It was established to guarantee peace, security and political stability. It consists of military, police and civilian components. The SADC brigade was constituted under the African Union protocol on peace and security which requires all regional economic communities to have standby peacekeeping forces.</p>
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	<p>15 The DRC, Rwanda is an applicant</p>
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>About 61 percent of the SADC programmes and projects are financed by international cooperating partners while the remainder comes from member state contributions.</p> <p>SADC is cooperating with plenty of partners like other RECs (e.g. EAC, COMESA, ECOWAS, IGAD), financial institutions like WB or AfDB, various UN organisations, development ministries for example from the US, Germany, UK and other institutions like EC, AU, WTO, OECD.</p>
<i>Comments</i>	Building block of AEC.

<i>Regional Organisation</i>	Tripartite Plus Commission (TPC)
<i>Established</i>	2004
<i>General description</i>	<p>Created specifically to solve continued security challenges in the region. Member states made commitments to eliminate the threat posed by illegal armed groups through peaceful and military means. Regular meetings will take place to discuss mutual security concerns.</p> <p>Its function is to improve regional relations and communication between its member states in security matters. A joint intelligence analysis cell has been created. It includes a verification mechanism to investigate accusations between the member states.</p>
<i>Peacebuilding</i>	See general description.
<i>No of members/ GL members</i>	4 Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda
<i>Partners/ Donors</i>	<p>Established and facilitated by the USA. The USA is taking the lead in training the members and MONUC personnel.</p> <p>Observers and support from UN, AU, EU, and the Executive Secretariat of the IC/GLR.</p>
<i>Comments</i>	Originally established as a short-term initiative. Aim is to become self-sufficient, but the USA must keep facilitating.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN MAPPING

ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
AfDB, ADB	African Development Bank
AFUR	African Forum for Utility Regulators
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
CAPP	Central African Power Pool
CDS	Defense and Security Commission
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
ComSec	Commonwealth Secretariat
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development
EADB	East African Development Bank
EAPC	East African Petroleum Conference
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMTF	Energy Ministerial Task Force
ENSAP	Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FOMAC	Central Africa Multinational Force
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IEA	International Energy Agency
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MARAC	Early Warning Mechanism
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NELSAP	Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAIDF	Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
STAP	Short Term Action Plan
SVP	Shared Vision Programme
TIFI	Trade, Industry, Mining, Finance and Investment
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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