

GIVE ME FIVE! - KEY BLOCKS TO GUIDE A EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY ON THE GEOPOLITICS OF DECARBONISATION

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DECEMBER 2019

Given the universal and cross-cutting nature of decarbonisation, what priorities should shape European foreign policy action in the decade ahead? How can the European Green Deal envisioned by the incoming Commission under Ursula von der Leyen help reshape relations with countries still dependent on fossil fuels or carbon-intensive assets and help them address related challenges? The new Commission needs to assess the challenges and opportunities that the geopolitical dimensions of decarbonisation present. As several country case studies show, foreign policy can support this process by making use of the entire diplomatic toolbox—including instruments related to trade, finance, security, and research and innovation—to promote more ambitious action on climate and energy and to diversify external relations away from fossil fuels.

Introduction: Decarbonisation as a foreign policy challenge

The 2015 Paris Agreement charts the course for climate policy action up to the end of the century. Having committed to the goal of limiting warming to well below 2°C or even 1.5°C, many countries are now implementing measures to decarbonise their economies. Crucial to these efforts will be the long-term transition away from fossil fuels to a more sustainable, low-carbon energy supply. By presenting its long-term vision in 2018, the European Commission has outlined how to realise a carbon-neutral Europe by the middle of the century, even if the official adoption is still missing.

During her bid to become the president of the new Commission for the years 2019 to 2024, Ursula von der Leyen announced that she would present a European Green Deal during her first 100 days in office. This initiative is set to



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include the preparation of the first European Climate Law to enshrine the 2050 climate neutrality target into law, the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System to other sectors, and the potential introduction of a carbon border tax to avoid carbon leakage, in line with World Trade Organization rules. This ambitious and timely initiative was further highlighted in the mission letters to the new Commissioners on Climate Action, Energy and Trade, among others. However, the implications of decarbonisation for foreign policy are yet to receive fuller consideration in the development of the EU's external relations.

Lowering greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in time to meet the Paris Agreement's goals necessitates deep, structural changes to existing economic development patterns. Given countries' varying natural resources, political settlements and levels of development, the transition is likely to take a different trajectory in each country. Alongside domestic factors, external market forces will shape this trajectory, including fluctuations in international commodity prices or falling prices of renewable energy technologies, among others. From this perspective, decarbonisation can be thought of as being characterized by two broad developments: (1) the decline and phase out of carbon-intensive development models based on the production and burning of fossil fuels and overexploitation of natural resources, and (2) the emergence of more sustainable forms of energy production and resource use.

The decline of carbon-intensive development constitutes challenges for countries, with their related exposure defined by their economic dependence on fossil fuels and other emissions-intensive products, which intersect with other factors that contribute to state fragility. However, the emergence of a new model presents also new opportunities and the prospect of long-term prosperity – for example, producing electricity in decentralized renewable energy grids can create jobs and reduce dependency on fuel imports.

The balancing of the challenges and opportunities is also relevant from a foreign policy perspective. By recalibrating and diversifying European external relations beyond relations linked to fossil fuels or carbon-intensive assets, foreign policymakers can play a role in preventing the destabilisation of countries and regions, as well as increased fragility connected to the eruption of violent conflict, and support the emergence of low-carbon development models and long-term peace and stability. In our analysis of the geopolitics of decarbonisation, we focused on six fossil-fuel exporting countries where fossil fuels have played an important role in their external relations with the EU and analysed how they may be affected by the decarbonisation of Europe. The case studies – Azerbaijan, Canada, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Qatar – revealed a variety of ways in which fossil fuel exporters or, more generally, carbon-dependent economies may be vulnerable to the global transition away from coal, oil, natural gas and other emission-intensive products that should see falling demand under decarbonisation (see Box I below). We identified several challenges and opportunities that the foreign policy community should take into consideration when striving to make EU external relations and the European Green Deal cohere.




	AZERBAIJAN 	CANADA 	COLOMBIA 	INDONESIA 	NIGERIA 	QATAR 
FRAGILITY (2019)	WARNING	SUSTAINABLE	STABLE	WARNING	ALERT	STABLE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2018)	HIGH	VERY HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	VERY HIGH
STRENGTH OF GOVERNANCE (2017)	MEDIUM	VERY HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW	HIGH
CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY (2017)	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM
 FOSSIL FUEL* TRADE WITH THE EU AND IN GENERAL						
FOSSIL FUELS AS % TOTAL EXPORTS**						
FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTS TO THE EU AS % TOTAL FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTS						
FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTS TO THE EU AS % TOTAL EXPORTS TO THE EU						
<p>* Indonesian trade in fossil fuels with the EU is not significant. In this case, the diagrams refer to EU-Indonesian trade in palm oil.</p> <p>** In all cases, "total exports" refers to total commodities exports (Source: https://resourcetrade.earth/)</p> <p> FOSSIL FUEL EXPORTS</p> <p> OTHER EXPORTS</p>						

Figure 1 | Overview of selected key characteristics of the case study countries

Challenges

Key Finding I: Decarbonisation can constitute a key political and economic challenge for fossil fuel exporters

Decarbonisation may have major implications for the economies of fossil-fuel dependent economies – as we can see especially in the cases of Azerbaijan, Nigeria and Qatar. In Azerbaijan, the oil and gas sectors have generally accounted for around half of the GDP and the state budget. In Qatar, the oil and gas industries are considered the engines of the economy, with the sectors accounting for around one fifth of GDP in 2016. Although diversifying the economy is now defined a government priority in Nigeria, the rise in federal revenues from petroleum extraction from the 1970s was accompanied by decades of neglect of other key economic sectors, particularly agricultural production. As a result, the oil industry still accounts for more than 10 percent of Nigeria’s GDP.

Reductions in fossil fuel revenues, for example from foreign exchange earnings, taxes or royalties, due to decarbonisation can impact government budgets and planning processes.

This may become relevant for all case study countries. In Colombia, for example, fossil-fuel exports generated US\$24 billion in revenue in 2017, accounting for nearly 70 percent of Colombian commodity export revenues. Crude oil and coal exports accounted for the vast majority of these earnings. In Indonesia, export revenues contributed 20.9 percent of Indonesia’s GDP in 2018, with fossil fuels and agricultural products (including palm oil) each providing just under 40 percent of foreign exchange earnings. The impact of the oil price slump of 2014 to 2016 on some of the case study countries – even though not a result of decarbonisation – can illustrate the potential disruption that decarbonisation-related price fluctuations could have on fossil fuel producers in future.

Fossil fuel assets at risk from stranding range from as yet untapped hydrocarbon reserves to fossil-fuel sector infrastructure. For example, in Nigeria fossil fuel reserves make up 40 percent of the country’s total assets. Its proven reserves in 2018 could support current oil production levels for another 50 years – falling demand could therefore have major implications for the value of its asset base. Stranded asset risks are high for new infrastructure projects that may be rendered obsolete before costs are amortized. For example, there has been significant investment in coal power plants in Indonesia and pipelines in Canada. Major investment in fracking and oil exploration is also expected in Colombia. Although in Qatar the emphasis of fossil fuel investments is increasingly shifting towards gas, which may somewhat mitigate the decarbonisation risk at least in the medium term, in 2018 14 percent of new investments were in the oil and gas sectors.

Key Finding II: The decarbonisation challenge can intersect with various other fragility and security risks

Economic challenges related to decarbonisation may exacerbate or add to the complexity of existing security risks at national or regional level. For example, in the case of Colombia, continued economic stability – to date based in part on fossil fuel exports – will be essential to meet the high costs of the country’s post-conflict development and of implementing the peace agreement with the FARC. It is also required to respond to other security challenges, such as narcotics production and trafficking, the continued activities of other insurgent groups, and the large influx of Venezuelan refugees. In Azerbaijan, the continuing, if “frozen” conflict with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is

considered a significant security risk, and serious obstacle to the country's full-scale development, and therefore to any efforts to develop a low-carbon economy.

Weak governance represents a significant barrier to diversifying government revenue streams beyond the oil and gas industries. For example, Nigeria performs poorly in all the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, which evaluate voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. In particular, the country has faced significant challenges in reining in corruption and the unaccountable use of revenues in the oil and gas sector, with consequences for the provision of public services and the wider economy. In Qatar, strong progress towards establishing a market economy and general economic performance has contrasted with deficiencies with respect to political participation, the rule of law and democratic institutions.

As the climate crisis deepens, impacts such as rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns may pose challenges for important economic sectors, such as agricultural production. Climate change is predicted to have a modest to high impact on the countries studied. For example, in Azerbaijan the agricultural sector is under threat because of increased evaporation, water shortages and droughts due to rising temperatures – while the sea level of the Caspian Sea may in fact fall as a result of increased evaporation. In Colombia, rising temperatures and increased water scarcity are of particular concern in the Andean region, home to 75 percent of the population, where the run-off from the mountains is the main water source for domestic and industrial users, farming and irrigation, and electricity generation. By contrast, countries like Canada, with lower vulnerability and sufficient resources to prepare for sea-level rise and rising temperatures, may even see some positive impacts, such as growth in agricultural food production in northern regions.

Key Finding III: Climate policy frameworks are in urgent need of further development, but ambitious climate policies faces significant resistance

Climate policy frameworks are at various stages of development, but none of the case study countries have yet developed targets and policies capable of meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. At one end of the spectrum, Qatar and Azerbaijan have yet to develop meaningful climate policies, with only some small measures being taken. Nigeria and Indonesia have made promising steps in developing their climate policy frameworks and mainstreaming climate policies within their economic development planning, but significant contradictions remain given the continued focus on expanding high-emitting sectors. At the more ambitious end of the spectrum, Canada and Colombia have passed climate change laws and have introduced a series of regulatory, policy and market instruments to bring down emissions. However, none of the case study countries are bringing emissions down in line with what is required to limit global temperature increase to well below 2°C, or even 1.5°C, in accordance with the Paris Agreement, and in all six cases there is significant scope for increasing ambition.

Ambitious policies to drive transformational climate action and low-carbon development face significant opposition especially from the fossil fuel industry, which is often influential at all levels of government, as well as among political parties and the public. The countries studied vary widely in terms of their socio-economic and political settings, but face some common barriers to enacting more ambitious climate policies. Importantly, the fossil fuel industry is a powerful political player in all

six countries. In five of the six countries, the governments run the oil and gas sectors or hold a large stake in companies in these sectors. In Qatar, the state is closely entwined with the fossil fuel industry and in Nigeria, revolving door politics and a lack of oversight and accountability have contributed to profound corruption. In Canada, climate change has become a highly partisan issue, with some political parties providing strong support to fossil fuel industries, which has hindered Canada in maintaining a consistent trajectory in its climate policy, both at federal and provincial level.

Opportunities

Key Finding IV: Decarbonisation can come with multiple co-benefits that can help to increase welfare and support stability

Developing the low-carbon economy can create new markets and opportunities for diversifying revenues. Countries could therefore experience significant co-benefits in the course of low-carbon transition, especially if they are able to adapt in a timely manner to emerging low-carbon trends and take a lead in new markets. Economic diversification may also rely on countries developing a value chain for more complex products, and therefore on the development of better education standards. For example, the development of renewable energies may not only help to reduce emissions, but can also generate significant positive economic and social effects. EU external relations can assist in this (and thereby develop fruitfully away from fossil fuels)

Co-benefits may include new and decent jobs, increased energy access via decentralised energy systems, and improved livelihood security and living standards in rural areas. These advantages are especially clear in developing countries like Nigeria, where only around 60 percent of the population are connected to the electricity grid, and 80 percent of those with grid access rely on generators running on expensive imported diesel fuel to cope with frequent outages. In rural areas of Nigeria 75 percent of people do not have access to electricity and instead rely on wood, charcoal, manure and crop residues for heating and cooking, which can lead both to higher rates of respiratory diseases and to deforestation. In terms of jobs, whereas there is significant potential for job creation in expanding sustainable energies in Nigeria, the oil and gas sectors account for less than 1 percent of jobs and are not expected to generate significant employment in future.

There is also varying yet still significant scope to increase energy efficiency across the six countries. With energy demand rising in all six, efficiency measures are essential to keep energy use and expenditure down and reduce emissions. In Indonesia, for example, if current policies are implemented and enforced, they could result in energy savings of 2 percent per year up to 2025. However, there is ample scope for increasing ambition, particularly in cooling and transport, as evidenced by Indonesia's low score on a World Bank index¹ assessing energy efficiency policies.

¹ World Bank's Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy Index. Available at: <https://rise.esmap.org/scores>

Key Finding V: The EU external relations can build on pre-existing cooperative arrangements of varying strength and form

Partnership and Cooperation Agreements can provide a sound basis for developing relations with the EU in areas that support decarbonisation and diversification away from fossil fuels. The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), concluded with Canada in 2016 alongside the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), is deepening and broadening already close political cooperation on a series of issues like international peace and security, clean energy and climate change, migration and peaceful pluralism, sustainable development, and innovation. In March 2018, a Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Qatar was signed as a basis for “enhanced political dialogue and strengthened cooperation on sectoral areas of mutual interests”, such as private-sector development, research and innovation. In the case of Azerbaijan, negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement than the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement are ongoing. Given its geographical proximity, Azerbaijan is already part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, since 2004) and the Eastern Partnership (since its inception in 2009) and has access to a number of financial/support mechanisms.

Free trade agreements can play an important role in promoting trade and investment in a range of sectors, and therefore in diversifying trade away from fossil fuels. The multi-party free trade agreement between the EU, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador has also allowed Colombian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to increase their exports to the EU and led to an increase in the share of agricultural products in trade between the two blocs. The free trade agreement is also an example of a “new generation” of free trade agreements, in which the EU has sought to promote sustainable development in its external trade relations, and includes clauses on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. In Indonesia, negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) have been progressing since 2016 with the aim of achieving an “ambitious and mutually beneficial trade agreement” and, as of July 2019, with regard to sustainable development the text on trade supporting climate action was the most advanced.

Alongside trade and investment, the EU has already established a range of measures for supporting education and skills development, and research and innovation, which are also essential to support economic diversification in all countries. The EU’s Erasmus+ programme supports higher education institutions, staff, and students in Colombia, Azerbaijan, Indonesia and Nigeria. Science and technology cooperation has been established with many partners. For example, the bilateral Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation signed between the EU and Canada in 1996 has fostered advanced and institutionalized relations in research. Similar initiatives also exist at regional level. EU-Colombia relations are shaped by various dialogues promoting cooperation within the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and these include the Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation

Key Finding VI: Proactively developing relations in sectors that will expand under the European Green Deal can help place cooperation on a sound footing as demand for fossil fuels demand declines in Europe.

In all countries, potential exists to diversify their economies away from carbon-intensive products that can serve as a future focus of cooperation for the EU. The Canadian services sector, overtook the manufacturing and energy sector as the engine of development and job creation in the 2010s, and accounts for 70 percent of Canadian GDP and employs three quarters of the Canadian working population. In Colombia, the development of the “orange economy” – entrepreneurship, innovative technologies and the creative sector – has become a focus for economic diversification and its share of Colombia's GDP is projected to double to at least 6 percent within a decade. To this end, public and private partners are currently invited to prepare a comprehensive development plan. Azerbaijan is showing strong aspirations to become a regional transport hub in Central Asia. In addition, the agricultural sector has strong prospects in Colombia, Indonesia and Nigeria, if climate-smart techniques are widely implemented. Several countries can also support diversification by reinvesting remaining fossil fuel revenues. Azerbaijan's state oil fund, for example, has typically invested accumulated savings from oil and gas revenues in energy and transport infrastructure, water and irrigation systems, as well as education and other socio-economic activities.

Anticipating the changes in the geopolitical landscape that will accompany the decarbonisation process will strengthen European external relations in the long-term, and can help to promote long-term peace and stability. Regional power dynamics and coalitions are also evolving under the influence of decarbonisation, as Qatar's reevaluation of its role within OPEC in part illustrates. By identifying the political and economic challenges and opportunities that these changes can create at an early stage, new opportunities for external relations can be created – politically, economically and socially. The EU is already actively working with partner countries to reshape geopolitical relations under decarbonisation. For example, in its close cooperation with partners like Canada within the ambit of organizations like the UN, the G7, the G20, WTO, the OECD, the IAEA and others. However, to make use of these prospects, greater inter-departmental coherence and coordination at EU level is needed as the final section of this policy brief shows.

No time to rest – how to ensure an active role of EU foreign policy to shape the geopolitics of decarbonisation?

By supporting partner countries in their efforts to diversify away from fossil fuels and by recalibrating relations with them to foster opportunities in new areas, the EU can strengthen its external relations and add another important dimension to the European Green Deal. Our case studies show that decarbonisation has political, social, and economic implications for many different aspects of the EU's foreign policy, including trade, finance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and economic and development cooperation. Whether a country is a net importer or exporter of fossil fuels, we can also expect the process of decarbonisation to reconfigure relations with other countries, in particular their energy relations. By considering potential scenarios ahead of time and adopting a preventive foreign policy approach that seeks to both facilitate decarbonisation efforts and mitigate associated security

risks with key partners, the EU can pave the way for fruitful, long-term, sustainable cooperation with international partners – and thus further support the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Overall, we can identify five building blocks with entry points for reforming EU foreign policy in the context of the geopolitics of decarbonisation. The good news is that a wide variety of activities and initiatives already exist and can serve as examples to inform the development of a European Green Deal for EU foreign policy.




Figure 2 | Overview of selected key characteristics of the case study countries

1. Climate and energy

Supporting the decarbonisation process itself is a core foreign policy requirement, and the EU can use a range of instruments to promote exchange and dialogue on climate friendly solutions in the field of energy production and beyond. These may include:

- Fostering country-specific as well as regional partnerships to support the preparation of key regulatory frameworks, including long-term climate mitigation strategies. In addition, fora such as the EU-China or EU-Africa summits in 2020 can be used to highlight the importance of promoting and guiding decarbonisation processes. In mainstreaming a long-term perspective, these can help pave the way for a transition process away from carbon-intensive investments. It can thus also inform the process of diversifying the energy mix in fossil-fuel dependent countries and underline the need to follow the principles of a just transition in those countries.
- Focusing bilateral energy partnerships and dialogues on the promotion of renewable energies and energy efficiency technologies and the phase out of fossil fuels, as well as supporting other initiatives that can showcase the co-benefits of sustainable energies. To this end the EU can continue to strengthen support for rural regions by investing in sustainable energy access and in

promoting SMEs in rural and urban regions. The EU could seek opportunities to showcase its knowledge and experience in developing sustainable energy solutions, and highlight the co-benefits of such alternatives.

- Sharing the EU's substantial expertise and experience in developing regional approaches to support decarbonisation. Prominent examples that have been of significant interest to partners include the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the development of Europe's highly interconnected electricity grid. This is likely to prove a fruitful area for cooperation with other regional institutions and partners, as well as larger countries like China, and can be further developed in future.

2. Trade and investment

Trade and investment form a key building block in the EU's external relations and may be further recalibrated to strengthen support for the process of global decarbonisation. The EU faces the central challenge of diversifying its external relations away from fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive products, and abolishing the range of incentives that support trade and investment in fossil fuels, while creating further incentives to boost trade and investment in sustainable energy and other sectors, can play an important role in this regard. To achieve this, the EU may consider:

- Ensuring that decarbonisation is reflected as a priority in trade and other economic agreements to further promote the mainstreaming of climate policy. The suggestion that a carbon border tax will be a key pillar in the European Green New Deal already hints at moves in this direction. The same holds true for the potential prominent role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to turn into a climate bank. Overall, trade agreements should aim to include enforceable measures to protect environmental and labour standards, and to facilitate the commitment of trading partners to the Paris Agreement.
- Exploring the potential for revising instruments that promote external trade to phase out financing for fossil-fuel-relevant incentive schemes. In this context, a valuable entry point can be to promote the revision of the relevant "sector understanding" on export credits e.g. for coal-fired electricity generation projects at OECD level.
- Promoting joint assessments on the risks of stranded assets that may arise as the Paris Agreement is implemented. The results can form a starting point for public-private dialogues and an entry point for international cooperation to deal with related links.

3. Science and education

To support partner countries in diversifying their economies away from fossil fuels and carbon-intensive products, as well as to develop relations with them under decarbonisation, areas such as research and education deserve stronger attention. Our country case studies indicate that the EU already has a number of tools available. For example, programmes addressing basic educational needs can yield important benefits in the long term. The EU may consider:

- Building on experience gained in the context of the Erasmus+ programme and promoting the integration of renewable energy and energy efficiency into university degree programmes (e.g. engineering) to support the development of a low-carbon, knowledge-based economy.
- Provide financial and technical assistance for vocational education and training (VET) programmes that support the development of skills required in low-carbon sectors. For example,

low-carbon jobs could be developed into a priority area for initiatives such as the VET Toolbox, which is co-funded by the EU and Germany.

- Exploring country-specific approaches, e.g. in Azerbaijan as a partner with already close relations to the EU, higher education programmes may be a fruitful approach, whereas the specific situation in Nigeria requires educational and vocational programmes to tackle high levels of unemployment among younger people as a first priority.

4. Finance and development

The EU can support decarbonisation by quickly phasing out financial support for high-carbon infrastructure and services, and focusing squarely on financing initiatives that strengthen low-carbon development. In addition, development finance and cooperation can work hand-in-hand to accelerate the just transition toward a decarbonised economy in partner countries, and EU-led initiatives can offer crucial support in this regard. By learning from the recent discussions within the EU on how to boost support for climate action via the EU budget, foreign policymakers could make a serious contribution to climate proofing the EU's external relations. Again, the EIB with its new climate strategy and energy-lending policy announced on 14 November 2019 can play a major role in this context. The EU could:

- Use the momentum of the debate on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 to ensure climate friendly investments as part of the EU's external relations, especially regarding fossil fuel exporters. To this end, the formulation of green budget lines in the area of external relations can serve as an entry point.
- Provide co-financing to complement the activities of other international climate finance instruments to ensure that lighthouse projects in countries depending on fossil fuels or other-carbon-intensive goods can be realised.
- Consider expanding the idea of just transition funds to the EU's external relations to encourage and support countries dependent on fossil fuels exports or the use of carbon/emission intensive goods to establish similar funding approaches. Greater engagement of the private sector could also be encouraged, including co-financing activities.

5. Security and peace

Finally, yet importantly, the geopolitics of decarbonisation is also about peace and security. The case study analysis revealed that some of the countries have already faced times of instability, tensions and violent conflict in the past. To avoid risks related to the sustainable transition leading to destabilisation, EU foreign policymakers also need to consider decarbonisation as part of long-term engagement strategies. To this end, the EU should

- Update and expand country and regional risks assessments to include the potential medium-term consequences of decarbonisation on fossil-fuel prices and the influence of stranded assets on market and political stability.
- Invest in strengthening the climate resilience of countries to second or third-order effects of climate change, such as increased migration, food shocks or trade disruptions due to extreme weather events and other natural disasters.
- Finally, aligning new strategies for building partnerships for and under decarbonisation with trade and finance-related initiatives in other sectors is necessary – by building a comprehensive approach the EU can support long-term stability and prevent the potentially destabilising effects

of decarbonisation. This is likely to become an increasingly important pillar of EU external relations with its respective partners going forwards.

The geopolitics of decarbonisation will create new challenges and opportunities for EU foreign policy. Addressing them will require an integrated and coherent approach covering these five different building blocks and this could also support the development of an external dimension to the European Green Deal initiative. To achieve this, the incoming Commission will need the support of various partners, including the European Parliament and the Council, as well as Member States. The latter can complement activities at the European level by contributing their own initiatives – for example, under the German EU presidency in the second half of 2020.

This policy brief is based on the findings from forthcoming report “The geopolitics of decarbonisation”. All references and sources referred to in this brief can be found in this report, which will be available at www.climate-diplomacy.org.

The **climate diplomacy initiative** is a collaborative effort of the German Federal Foreign Office in partnership with adelphi. The initiative and this publication are supported by a grant from the German Federal Foreign Office.

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